Can IFQs Be Applied to the Whaling Controversy?

When we think of whaling, it often arouses strong emotions.  We often discuss the suffering of the whale when it is killed, the importance of conserving the whale population as an endangered species, the whale’s role in its ecosystem, and the rights of the whales to live versus the rights of humans to hunt them for traditional or survival purposes (the classic argument of intrinsic versus instrumental value).  However, these questions and issues are often considered from an ethical standpoint; for example, we answer the question “is it right to kill the whales?” in terms of anthropocentric or biocentric viewpoints; whether we value the whales because they have economic value or because they have a right to exist.  These questions, while interesting from a philosophical point of view, merely give insight about the way people value whales ethically, not monetarily.  This positive analysis lends itself to a discussion of why the world is the way it is, not how we might go about fixing the issue or monetizing how people value whales.  To fix the whale hunting issue, we must think more normatively; we must consider what solution would be best and how we can steer society and the economy in that direction.   While some may view it as morally wrong to place a monetary value on a life, my first instinct is to approach this from an economics standpoint.  While the killing of whales may be morally wrong to many people, there are clearly those countries that still have a very high willingness to pay for the ability to continue hunting whales.  Ergo, I believe that the best solution comes in the form of economic incentives; a tradable permit system for whaling similar to those that have been instituted in the commercial fishing sector to maintain fishery populations at a stable level while still allowing for profitable commercial fishing. 

As we read in class, the International Whaling Commission is currently sitting at a crossroads.  On the one hand, the majority of world powers (including the United States) desire a complete ban on whaling based on ethical ideals and public pressure.  On the other hand, Japan and Norway have a strong desire to continue their practice of whaling because of the economic benefit and the tradition.  Although a moratorium on whaling has been enacted, Norway and Japan continue to hunt whales and defy the moratorium, which weakens its credibility and can potentially induce other countries to defy the moratorium as well.  This is where the tradable permit system comes in.

Fisheries around the world are beginning to adopt systems of Individual Fishing Quotas (IFQs), which act as a form of “cap and trade” for fisheries.  Each fishery has a total allowable catch based on historical numbers, which provides an incentive to improve the quality of the catch because the fishermen will want to maintain the population for future years instead of overfishing to gain the most profit.  Those vessels that would make more profit selling more of their quotas instead of using them to fish can sell those permits on the quota market, which allows every boat to operate at efficiency.  New Zealand is an incredible example of an ITQ success story; as of 2005, it was managing 93 different species of fish in 550 different quota markets.  The United States jumped on the bandwagon in 2004 with the US Ocean Action Plan, which will put IFQs in place in the US, one fishery at a time.  IFQs have been proven to improve the health of the fishery (maximum sustainable yield), create less animosity between government and fishermen, and turn fishermen into conservationists.  I believe this IFQ system, with a few alterations to account for a smaller niche market, can successfully regulate the hunting of whales.  If the willingness to pay of Japan and Norway is so high that they are willing to disregard the international moratorium to hunt whales, we should introduce an international tradable permit system for catching whales that would allow both environmental groups and whaling countries to purchase the quotas via auction.  This allows environmental groups like the Sea Shepherds in “Whaling Wars” to purchase the lives of whales to save them from being killed.  Some argue that we should not put a monetary value on life because it is unethical, but a price tag on whaling would help limit excessive whaling by making the ability to hunt whales more costly.

These permits would clearly require an economic analysis of both the maximum sustainable yield of whales every year and the cost of a whale’s life so that the permits can be allocated and priced accordingly before auction.  The system will also require the cooperation of both pro and anti-whaling countries to aid in the construction of a new environmental regime that would regulate the tradable permit system.  I believe that one solution for increased cooperation is to guarantee a certain number of whaling permits for Japan and Norway that could decrease over time given the potential changes in the willingness to pay for whaling in pro-whaling countries.  While there is no easy solution to the whaling issue, I believe that if the anti-whaling groups can compromise and allow whales to be hunted with regulation, pro-whaling countries will be more interested in cooperating, compromising, and instituting a system of economic incentives to regulate the hunting of whales in a sustainable and ethical manner.